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Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: A Two Year Survey
by James P. Fleissner
and

Jeffrey R. Harris**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys significant constitutional criminal procedure
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
issued during 1997 and 1998. The "constitutional" branch of criminal
procedure focuses on the interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. In selecting "signifi-

cant" decisions, we emphasized questions of first impression, other
noteworthy cases, and issues likely to interest attorneys practicing in the

courts of the Eleventh Circuit. We have endeavored to summarize the
selected decisions and provide commentary that, hopefully, will
illuminate the issues and assist the reader in understanding the
importance and implications of the cases.
Although it is difficult to characterize two years of decisions, one
useful methodology stems from a classic article authored by Professor
Herbert L. Packer.'
Professor Packer suggested that the criminal

* Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University,
Macon, Georgia. Marquette University (B.A., 1979); University of Chicago Law School
(J.D., 1986). Before joining the Mercer faculty, the co-author was a federal prosecutor in
Chicago from 1986-1994, last serving as Chief of the General Crimes Section of the U.S.
Attorney's Office. The co-author currently is serving as Senior Associate Independent
Counsel in United States v. Henry G. Cisneros, et al. Views expressed in this Article are
solely those of the authors, and do not represent the views of the Office of Independent
Counsel.
** University of Georgia (B.A., 1995); Mercer University (M.B.A., 1996); Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1999). Member,
Mercer Law Review, 1997-1999; Editor in Chief, 1998-1999.
1. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
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justice system may be viewed from the perspective of two models: the
Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model.2 The Crime Control
Model emphasizes the efficient apprehension and punishment of
criminals and the protection of citizens from crime.3 The image of the
Crime Control Model is that of an assembly line on which crimes are
systematically investigated and prosecuted. The Due Process Model
focuses on the process used to determine guilt or innocence. It is more
concerned with the integrity of the process and the sanctity of constitutional safeguards. The image of the Due Process Model is an obstacle
course that presents impediments to wrongful convictions and law
enforcement practices that infringe on the rights of citizens.4
Obviously, the American system of criminal justice does not embody
either of these two models exclusively, nor could it. Rather, the system
reflects the ongoing tension between the two models. The American
system is a compromise between the models that is constantly being
struck and restruck in individual decisions, including those by the
courts. Viewed from the perspective of the two models, the decisions of
the Eleventh Circuit tend to favor the Crime Control Model. That
generalization has more force if one considers the totality of the
decisions of the court, including the entire docket of the court and not
just cases involving a published opinion. But as this survey illustrates,
the court often vindicates the values of the Due Process Model, and in
other cases the voices of dissent advocate those values. Of course,
opinions advancing the Due Process Model are over-represented here
precisely because the result (or the dissent) favoring Due Process values
over Crime Control values makes the cases noteworthy. That said, the
general leaning of the Eleventh Circuit towards the Crime Control Model
should not obscure the significant strain of Due Process values running
through the body of the court's decisions.
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.'

2. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 9-13.
4. Id. at 13.

5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Standing/ReasonableExpectation of Privacy
The Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model differ greatly
concerning the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the scope
of the exclusionary rule. The Crime Control Model favors a more narrow
view of the scope of Fourth Amendment protections and abhors the
suppression of evidence as a sanction for illegal searches and seizures.
The Due Process Model favors an expansive view of Fourth Amendment
rights and endorses the exclusion of evidence as the only viable means
of deterring over-reaching by law enforcement officials. This tension
between the values of the two models is illustrated by several notable
decisions of the Eleventh Circuit.
In a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit decided whether the
driver of an overdue rental car has the legitimate expectation of privacy
necessary to provide standing to challenge a search of the car. In United
States v. Cooper,6 Cooper rented a car from Budget. The car was due
back at the rental office on January 20. On January 24, four days after
the car became overdue, the Florida Highway Patrol ("FHP") stopped
Cooper for making an illegal lane change. When the trooper discovered
the rental car was overdue, he contacted Budget and the company asked
him to tow the car. Cooper asked to speak to a Budget representative,
but the trooper refused to let him speak on the phone. Cooper maintained he had rented cars from Budget several other times and believed
he could extend the rental contract if the necessary credit was available
on his credit card to cover the additional days. There was some evidence
that Budget had an unwritten policy of extending the deadline.
However, the extension required the renter to make either a written or
oral request to extend the time. There was no evidence that Cooper had
done either.7
The trooper conducted a sweep search of the passenger compartment
of the car and discovered a loaded firearm in the glove compartment. He
arrested Cooper on a firearms charge and conducted an inventory search
of the vehicle pursuant to FHP policy. The search revealed two safes in
the trunk of the car. A drug dog "hit" on the safes. When the trooper
pried them open, he discovered cocaine, cocaine base, scales, and other
drug-related paraphernalia.' Cooper was charged with and convicted
of several federal drug offenses and sentenced to life in prison. 9

6. 133 F.3d 1394, 1398-99 (11th Cir. 1998).
7. Id. at 1395-96.
8. Id. at 1396-97.
9. Id. at 1397.
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Cooper moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the search, but
the district court concluded Cooper lacked standing to challenge the
search of the rental car.'° The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the search was
constitutionally permissible."
The court noted that standing to
challenge a search requires a two-part analysis. 2 First, a party must
have a subjective expectation of privacy. Second, this subjective
expectation of privacy must be one that "society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable."'3 There was no dispute that Cooper subjectively
maintained an expectation of privacy in the rental car. This was so, the
court noted, because Cooper's previous dealings with Budget led him to
believe he could extend the rental contract if he had enough credit
available on his credit card.' 4
The court began its legal analysis by discussing several "indicia of
reasonableness" of the expectation of privacy. First, the court explained
that dicta from a prior Eleventh Circuit decision indicated a defendant
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car three
weeks overdue. 1' However, while recognizing this dicta as one indicia
of reasonableness, the court refused to endorse the statement made in
the prior decision.'" The court also pointed to a district court opinion
finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car one month
overdue, but again explicitly declined to embrace that result. 7
The court then analyzed the Fourth Circuit decision in United States
v. Wellons.'5 In Wellons the driver of a rental car challenged a search
of the car that revealed drugs. The Fourth Circuit concluded the driver
did not have standing to contest the search because he was not listed as
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1402.
12. Id. at 1398.
13. Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n.12 (1978)); see also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979) (explaining that the subjective expectation must be
objectively reasonable under the circumstances).
14. Cooper, 133 F.3d at 1398.
15. Id. at 1398-99 (citing United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1987)
(relying on United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986)). The court, however,
noted that it was not holding that a driver who keeps a rental car three weeks after its due
date maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy. "We stress that our reference to the
facts of Smith and the attendant dicta in Miller are merely for indicia purposes. . . ." 133
F.3d at 1399 n.10.
16. Id. at 1399 & n.10.
17. Id. at 1399-1400 & n. 12. The court also pointed to two other indicia of reasonableness: the failure of the prosecution to contest the driver's privacy in Smith, and the fact
that the Florida Highway Patrol asked Cooper for permission to search. Id. at 1399. The
inferences drawn from both of these indicia seem tenuous at best.
18. 32 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 1994).
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an authorized driver on the rental contract. 19 The Eleventh Circuit
distinguished Wellons.2 ° Unlike Wellons, Cooper was listed on the
rental contract and was contractually obligated to pay for the rental car's
use. Therefore, "Cooper's expectation of privacy was materially different
from that of Wellons."2 '
The court also rejected any comparison to rental contracts involving
hotel rooms.22 A decision by the Sixth Circuit, finding that a motel
patron did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when the motel
clerk repossessed the room after the patron failed to check out at the
allotted time, was distinguishable according to the Eleventh Circuit.23
In Cooper, the court concluded, "Budget ... had not repossessed the
rented property prior to the challenged search."24
Ultimately, the court determined that Cooper's privacy expectation
was reasonable based on the aggregation of several factors: (1) the car
was only four days overdue,28 (2) Cooper was in actual possession of the
vehicle and the rental agency had not taken any affirmative steps to
repossess the vehicle,26 (3) Cooper actually paid for the rental use
during the four days the car was overdue,27 and (4) even though he did
not avail himself of the option, "a simple phone call could have extended
the rental contract past the date of the warrantless search." 28 Accordingly, the court concluded Cooper retained sufficient control over the
vehicle "for it to fall within the zone of constitutional sanctity."29 After
holding Cooper had standing, the court remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the search was permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. °
Ultimately, it is very difficult to predict, based on the court's holding
in Cooper, when a defendant will maintain an expectation of privacy in
an overdue rental car. The court was careful to avoid endorsing any
specific length of time when a defendant's possession of an overdue car

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 119.
Cooper, 133 F.3d at 1400.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Id. at 1401.
Id. at 1400.

26. Id.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 1402.

29. Id.
30. Id. The district court did not resolve the issue of whether the search was
permissible as a consent search. The court focused exclusively on the standing issue. Id.
at 1396 n.4.
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might be deemed unreasonable. Therefore, this case is likely confined
largely to its facts and to the aggregation of factors that persuaded the
court that Cooper's expectation was a reasonable one. Thus, although
Cooper promotes the values of the Due Process Model, it is hardly a
major advance for privacy rights.
B.

Probable Cause
In an en banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the confession of one defendant can provide sufficient probable
cause to arrest a co-defendant. In Craig v. Singletary,3 1 Miami Police
detectives arrested Craig and charged him with murder. His arrest
stemmed from a rather convoluted series of events. On October 25,
1988, Junior Richards was shot to death after two men attempted to rob
him. An anonymous tip implicated Donald Craig. Miami Police
detectives went to Craig's house to interview him. After initially
providing the officers with a false name, Craig identified himself and
agreed to talk with the police. Craig told the officers that he had once
worked as a confidential informant and he would tell them what he
knew about the crime. Craig voluntarily accompanied the detectives to
the police station. During the ride, the detectives informed him several
times that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.
After twice reading him his Mirandarights, the detectives interviewed
Craig and informed him (falsely) that his fingerprints had been
discovered in the victim's car. Craig told the detectives he had been in
the victim's car just prior to the killing because the two were friends.
He said he knew more about the crime and would tell them the rest
after they arrived at the police station. At the station, Craig signed a
written waiver of his Miranda rights, and the detectives interviewed
him. Craig admitted being in the victim's car, but again claimed he left
the scene before the crime took place. However, he did remember seeing
two people running from the scene later that same night; he identified
them as Henry Lee Newsome and Rodney Newsome. According to Craig,
Rodney Newsome was carrying a gun. The detectives informed Craig
that his story was not very believable, but they reiterated that he was
not under arrest. Craig replied that he wanted to take a polygraph to
prove he was telling the truth.
Before taking the polygraph, Craig signed another Miranda waiver
and a polygraph release form. While the polygraph was being administered, Henry Lee Newsome was brought to the station for questioning.
He confessed to involvement in the robbery. His confession was

31.

127 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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corroborated by a witness who identified Newsome as one of the robbers
by picking him out of a photo lineup. The witness was not able to
identify Craig. Newsome told the police that Craig had committed the
murder. 2
Craig was informed that the polygraph results indicated he was being
deceptive. He told the detectives he wanted to speak with another
detective with whom he had worked as an informant. The police did not
believe they had enough evidence to arrest Craig, so they continued to
treat him as if he was not under arrest. Eventually, Craig spoke with
the detective he had requested. He did not specifically confess; however,
he did state, "I really messed up. I really messed up. All I wanted to do
was rip the guy."" He then told the detective that he had remarked
to another detective during a previous interview, "if you have that
against me you might as well get me a lawyer." 4 None of the detectives remembered Craig ever asking for a lawyer or commenting about
a lawyer up until that point.3 5
Craig eventually confessed to involvement in the robbery. He blamed
the shooting on Newsome, although he contended he held the gun while
Newsome pulled the trigger. He signed a written statement to that
effect. While the officers prepared the paperwork on the case against
Newsome and Craig, Craig waited in the interview room. An hour and
a half after his original confession, Craig requested to speak again with
the officers. This time, he stated he had heard Newsome's voice in the
building and realized Newsome would blame him for the murder,
so he
36
wanted to confess. He then confessed to shooting the victim.

Craig was convicted of murder in Florida, and his conviction was
upheld by the Florida appellate courts. He sought habeas corpus relief
in the federal courts. His habeas petition was denied by the district
court, and he appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The district court was
reversed by a panel decision, and that decision was later vacated when
the Eleventh Circuit decided to hear Craig's appeal en banc. s7
Craig attacked his conviction on two grounds. First, he argued that
his confession should have been suppressed because it occurred after he
indicated he wanted to speak with a lawyer.3 " Second, in his Fourth

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1032-35.
Id. at 1035.
Id.
Id.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1036-38.
38. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The Court in Edwards held that a
confession that results from police questioning after a suspect requests counsel is unlawful.

Id. at 487.
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Amendment claim, Craig argued he was arrested without probable cause
because, if his original confession was unlawful and could not be
considered, the only evidence that the police had to establish probable
cause was the confession by Newsome. Craig contended a codefendant's
uncorroborated confession could not establish probable cause to arrest.
Accordingly, he argued his second confession was also unlawful because
it was the product of an illegal arrest.39
Turning to Craig's first argument, the court concluded that, even
assuming that the first confession occurred after he had requested a
lawyer, it was irrelevant. His second confession "was more harmful to
Craig than the first, because the second one incorporated all that was
incriminating from the first and added something worse."' Further,
his second confession was not prompted by police interrogation. Craig
asked to speak with the officers after he confessed the first time.
Because Craig prompted the second confession, it was not invalidated by
a prior request for counsel.41
In its ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue, the court also determined probable cause to arrest Craig existed after Newsome implicated
him in the crime.42 Therefore,. the court concluded, the second confession was not barred, as Craig contended, because it took place after an
illegal arrest.4 3 Interestingly, there was evidence in the record that
both the detectives who interviewed Craig and the prosecutor in his
state trial did not believe there was sufficient probable cause to arrest
Craig after Newsome implicated him. However, the Eleventh Circuit
determined the subjective beliefs of police officers and prosecutors were
irrelevant. 44 What matters, the court explained, is whether under an
objective approach, there was enough "reasonably trustworthy information which would cause
a prudent person to believe that Craig had
"4
committed a felony. 1
The Eleventh Circuit expressly held in Craig that as long as a
codefendant's confession is not incredible, 4 "a co-defendant's confession

39. 127 F.3d at 1037.
40. Id. at 1040.
41. The court held that a confession was not an Edwards violation if the accused
requests counsel but then later initiates contact with the police. Id. at 1039 (citing Minnick
v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 155 (1990)).
42. Id. at 1041.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1046.
46. Id. For an example of an incredible confession the court offered: "For example, the
confession of a mental patient that he and the suspect, aided by an army of little green
men, committed the crime clearly would not past muster." Id.
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that he and the suspect committed the crime can supply probable cause
to arrest the suspect."47 The indicia of credibility in this case was the
fact that a witness to the crime corroborated Newsome's confession, and
this witness identified Craig as a participant. Further, Craig's use of an
alias when the police initially approached him and the fact that he had
been implicated by an anonymous tip constituted additional evidence.'
Finally, the court explained that "[i]ndications of deception on a
polygraph examination may be taken into account in determining
whether probable cause exists."49
Three judges concurred in part and dissented in part because the
court's suggestion that a codefendant's confession, standing alone, can
supply probable cause troubled them. ° The dissenters pointed out
such a conclusion was clearly unnecessary in this case because there was
additional evidence beyond Newsome's confession implicating Craig in
the crime."' The dissenters concurred with the court's conclusion that
under a totality approach, there was enough evidence to arrest Craig. 2
However, they disagreed with the majority's decision, which they
considered to be dicta, that "Newsome's statement alone was enough.""
This conclusion, the dissenters believed, was "a new principle of law...
unnecessary to [the]5 4disposition of the case, [that] conflicts with the
established caselaw."
The decision in Craig seems correct in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Illinois v. Gates.55 In Gates the Court concluded that
probable cause determinations should be based on the "totality of
circumstances." 6 The Court rejected the rigid formulaic determinations of probable cause that characterized several previous decisions.5 7
In light of that approach, it seems that the abundant evidence implicating Craig, when coupled with Newsome's confession, provided the police
with sufficient probable cause to arrest. The interesting question about

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1045-46.
at 1046.
at 1046-47 (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
at 1047.

53. Id.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1049.
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 238.

57. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). The Court in Gates rejected the Aguilar-Spinelli test for making determinations
of probable cause. 462 U.S. at 238. This test was a two-part inquiry into an informant's
(1) basis of knowledge and (2) veracity. Id. at 233.
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the implications of the court's decision is the one raised by the dissenters: Does the majority opinion countenance a finding of probable cause
based on codefendant Newsome's confession alone? In several contexts,
the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism about the reliability of a
suspect's postarrest statements admitting a degree of guilt but pointing
the finger at another person.5" It must be remembered, however, that
those expressions of skepticism did not occur in the context of a
determination of probable cause under the Gates test. Under that
generous test, which is definitely an example of the values of the Crime
Control Model, the majority's conclusion appears sound.
In United States v. Talley,"9 the Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue
of whether a tip supplied by a confidential informant provides the
probable cause necessary to justify a warrantless search of the suspect's
vehicle. In Talley a confidential informant with a history of providing
reliable information contacted the police about a drug transaction. The
informant told the police he had observed two suspects entering a
residence and had also witnessed one of the suspects "remove ... cocaine
from his pants."6 ° The informant described the suspect's car and the
location where he claimed the suspects were in the process of "cook[ing]'
the powder cocaine into . . . 'crack' cocaine."

1

Several police officers

went to the location and began surveillance. The officers confirmed the
description of the car and the residence. While the surveillance was
underway, the suspects left the residence, returned to their car, and
drove away. One of the suspects "had a bulge in his pants." 2 The
police followed and stopped the vehicle. A "pat-down" search revealed
that the suspicious bulge was 24.7 grams of cocaine hydrochloride. A
subsequent search of the entire vehicle revealed an additional 105.4
grams of cocaine base."
Both defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the
search." The Government argued that the initial stop of the vehicle
was justified as an investigatory Terry stop.65 The discovery of the
cocaine during the pat-down search provided probable cause to arrest.
Therefore, the Government concluded, the search of the vehicle was valid

58. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (construing 804(b)(3) penal
interest exception); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (confrontation clause

case).
59.

108 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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as a search incident to the arrest. At the suppression hearing, the
district court rejected that analysis but upheld the search on another
ground.66 The court concluded the officers had probable cause to search
the vehicle based on the confidential informant's tip and the independent
verification of that information by police. The Eleventh Circuit adopted
"the district court's reasoned approach" in upholding the decision.6 7
The court determined "the information provided by the confidential
informant ... when combined with independent corroboration by the
police, rose to the level of probable cause."' The court concluded the
officer's verification that the car and the house were as they were
described by the confidential informant, coupled with the mysterious
"bulge," provided probable cause. 9
This conclusion is somewhat
remarkable considering the Government did not contend there was
sufficient probable cause to search the car and there was little discussion
of the informant's past record of providing reliable information. °
Further, what the court deemed "independent corroboration" 7 1 pertained to the minor details of the type of car the suspects were driving
and the address of the house the suspects entered. Obviously, when a
court goes beyond the arguments advanced by the Government to uphold
a search, the decision becomes fodder for those who criticize that court
for having too strong a bias for the values of the Crime Control Model.
In United States v. Wai-Keung,72 the Eleventh Circuit analyzed
whether police had the particularized probable cause necessary to arrest
a suspect associated with a multi-person credit card fraud operation. In
Wai-Keung Agent Cachinero of the Secret Service was investigating an
Asian-American credit card fraud ring. The group operated in the West
Palm Beach area and, posing as wealthy Asian businessmen, purchased
expensive items from exclusive stores by using fake credit cards. On
January 12, 1993, Agent Cachinero went to a local mall to investigate
complaints by merchants that the ring was operating out of the mall.
He interviewed several store clerks who told him the group operated in
pairs, with one member making purchases and the other serving as a
lookout. The agent verified this information with a representative of a
73
credit card company.

66. Talley, 108 F.3d at 281.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 281-82.
70. Id. at 280. The court succinctly noted that the informant "had provided reliable
information in the past." Id.
71. Id. at 282.
72. 115 F.3d 874 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
73. Id. at 875-76.
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Several weeks later, Agent Cachinero was summoned to the mall by
mall employees who told him that a group of Asian-American men were
in the mall making large purchases with credit cards, and the cards
were being rejected. The men fit the descriptions given by other mall
employees, and they
used the same modus operandi with which the
74
agent was familiar.

After arriving at the mall, Agent Cachinero obtained a video showing
two Asian-American men at one counter and two other men making
credit card purchases at another counter. One of the men furtively
handed something to his cohort during one of the transactions, and all
of the men appeared nervous. An off duty police officer informed Agent
Cachinero that a group of Asian-Americans was making credit card
purchases at another store in the mall. Cachinero went to the store and
observed the group. One of the men in this group was also in the group
that was captured on the video tape. The other three were not on the
videotape. Agent Cachinero observed two of the men "browsing among
the merchandise." 75 These two men were later identified as Tam and
Li.

Another man sat in a chair "facing the mall ... acting as a

lookout."76 The fourth man was purchasing items with a false credit
card. He was identified as Sun. The group left this store and proceeded
to another store where Sun made another credit card purchase while
Tam and Li stood next to him. After the group left the second store,
Agent Cachinero approached them, identified himself, and requested
identification. Sun produced a driver's license and credit cards that
Cachinero believed were fake. Li produced a Florida license in his own
name. Agent Cachinero arrested all three men.
Li argued his arrest was not based on probable cause because there
was no evidence he was involved with the theft ring. He argued "he was
just waiting while others purchased merchandise or just watching them
make purchases." 7' Therefore, because there was no particularized
probable cause to believe he personally had committed some crime, his
arrest was illegal. s
The Eleventh Circuit rejected his argument. The court agreed with
the district court and concluded there was sufficient evidence to
implicate Li in a "multi-person operation" engaged in a criminal

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id.

78. Id.
79. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding that probable cause to arrest
must be particularized with respect to a specific person and not based on association with
a group who may be engaged in wrongdoing).
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enterprise."0
The court determined Li was personally implicated
because the group was a multi-person operation and Li was a member
of the group." Further, he stood next to one of the members while that
member used phony credit cards. The group itself used the same modus
operandi, purchasing expensive items in exclusive stores, and was
comprised of Asian-Americans. Therefore, the court concluded there was
"no basis on which it can be concluded, as Li suggests, that he was just
waiting while others purchased merchandise or just watching them
make purchases."82 This conclusion is a bit overstated given the
evidence and is unnecessary to reaching the conclusion that there was
probable cause to arrest Li. The court's sweeping conclusion that there
was "no basis" to credit Li's theory of innocence looks all the more
inappropriate in light of the reference in a footnote to the conclusion
stating that "subsequent events verify Li's culpability." 3 The footnote
begins by conceding the irrelevance of subsequent events to the analysis
of whether there was probable cause to arrest Li. 4 One is left to
wonder why the court chose to engage in overstatement and to highlight
a concededly irrelevant point. If one views the court as too friendly to
the perspective of law enforcement, the conclusion that will be drawn is
obvious.
Judge Barkett, in dissent, disagreed with the court's conclusion that
there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Li.8 5 "[Tihe worst that can
be said of [Li] at the time of arrest is that he was associating with
people who were breaking the law." 8 The dissent pointed out that
there was no evidence that Li passed a stolen credit card because he was
not on the video the agent observed, there was no evidence that Li was
aware of the scheme or that he possessed any fake credit cards, and
when asked for identification, Li produced his driver's license."
Therefore, Judge Barkett concluded, there simply was not enough
particularized evidence to arrest Li." The dissent took the majority to
task (albeit gently) for its reference to subsequently obtained evidence
of Li's guilt.8 9

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Wai-Keung, 115 F.3d at 876.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 878 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 879.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 879 n.1.
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Although this was a close case, and notwithstanding the majority's
aggressive opinion, the result reached by the majority is defensible. Li's
conduct was more than mere association with persons committing a
crime; the nature, timing, and proximity of Li's association with persons
engaging in suspicious conduct created probable cause that Li was a
knowing participant. The totality of the circumstances reasonably led
to the conclusion that there was particularized probable cause as to Li.
While it might be too much to say there was "no basis" to conclude Li's
conduct was innocent, it can be said that there is enough basis to
conclude Li was a participant and that the probable cause standard was
met.
C. Consent to Search
In two cases the Eleventh Circuit overturned convictions obtained from
the consent searches of passengers on board buses. These two cases are
good examples of the Eleventh Circuit reining in crime-fighting efforts
and vindicating the values of Professor Packer's Due Process Model. In
United States v. Guapi, ° a Greyhound bus made a scheduled stop in
Mobile, Alabama, en route to its destination of Miami, Florida. Two
officers from the Mobile drug unit boarded the bus. One officer, Marvin
Whitfield, was in uniform. His partner was wearing street clothes.
Officer Whitfield stood in the front of the bus near the exit and
announced:
I'm Officer Marvin Whitfield with the Mobile Police Department Drug
Interdiction Unit. With your cooperation, I'd like to check on-board
cargo for illegal contraband such as alcohol, narcotics, weapons, or
explosives. With your consent and cooperation, I'd like to ask you to
bring down your on-board luggage if you have any overhead and have
it open so I can do a quick on-board inspection. 9'
Officer Whitfield never informed the passengers they could refuse to
consent to the search. As the passengers pulled their luggage from the
overhead compartments, Officer Whitfield worked his way down the
aisle, from front to back, inspecting the contents of the passengers'
luggage. He discovered a brick shaped object in Guapi's bag, and after
a drug dog indicated that the object contained narcotics, Officer
Whitfield arrested Guapi.9 2
Guapi argued the consent search was invalid because it was not
voluntary and moved to suppress the evidence. The district court

90. 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
91. Id. at 1394.
92. Id.
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concluded the search was valid and determined it was "irrelevant that
[the] encounter took place on a bus."9 3 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.9 4 The court began its analysis with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick.95 In Bostick the Court refused
to require that police inform passengers during a bus search they were
free to leave and instead held the appropriate inquiry is whether a
reasonable person would believe consent to search was optional under
the circumstances.' The Court found two factors particularly relevant.
First, informing passengers they could refuse consent strengthens the
argument that consent is freely given.97 Second, officers should not
threaten passengers with the use of force in order to obtain consent.98
The Eleventh Circuit seized upon the fact that Officer Whitfield had
not informed passengers they could refuse the search. The court
conceded the Supreme Court rejected such a per se requirement;99
however, the court concluded, "we feel that a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would not have felt free to disregard Officer
Whitfield's requests without some positive indication that consent could
have been refused.""° Several factors seemed particularly important
to the court in drawing this conclusion. First was the fact this search
took place in the cramped confines of a bus..' while Officer Whitfield
stood at the front of the bus blocking the exit. He also conducted the
search from front to back, preventing passengers from leaving without
passing him. Further, Officer Whitfield's search procedure seemed
"carefully designed to convince passengers that they had no choice but
to accede to [his] demands."0 2 The court also noted that Officer
Whitfield apparently made his announcement very rapidly,0 3 so the
passengers may not have understood the search was based on their

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1395.
Id.
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id. at 432.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that officers

are not required to inform suspects that they may refuse to consent to a search).
100. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1395.
101. The Court in Bostick recognized that the fact that a search takes place on a bus

is an important factor in evaluating the voluntainess of consent to search. See Bostick, 501
U.S. at 435.
102. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1395.
103. Id. at 1396. Part of this conclusion derived from the fact that at the suppression
hearing Officer Whitfield repeated his speech so rapidly that the court reporter had to
interrupt him three times to accurately transcribe it. Id.
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"consent and cooperation." °4 Finally, it was also important to the
court that Whitfield operated a veritable "consent search" machine. He
testified he conducted approximately twenty-eight bus searches per
week, and he could only recall several occasions when passengers
refused consent.' °5 Based on the totality of these factors, the court
concluded, "a reasonable person traveling in this bus would not have felt
free to ignore the search request ...

[therefore] this search was

unconstitutional.""°
The Eleventh Circuit examined another bus search in United States
v. Washington.1 7 In Washington two federal agents boarded a bus in
Jacksonville, Florida. Both agents were in plain clothes and their
weapons were concealed. One agent went to the front of the bus and the
other to the back. Holding his badge over his head, Agent Perkins, who
was at the rear of the bus, announced:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My partner and I are both
federal agents with the United States Department of Justice. No one
is under arrest or anything like that, we're just conducting a routine
bus check. When we get to you, if we could please see your bus ticket,
some photo identification if you have some with you, please, and if you
would please identify which bag[] is yours on the bus we'd appreciate
it and we'll be out of your way just as quick as we can.'0 8
The agents moved down the aisle, starting from the back of the bus,
asking each passenger if they were carrying "drugs, weapons, large sums
of money, or firearms."0 9 The agents did not try to block the aisle and
stood behind each passenger as they conducted their sweep of the bus.
Eventually, they arrived at Washington's seat and asked him if he was
carrying any contraband. He replied he was not, and the agents
requested his identification and bus ticket. After he identified his
luggage, the agents asked Washington if they could search his bags. He
consented. During the encounter Agent Perkins believed Washington
was acting suspicious. Washington was crouched over in his seat and
appeared to be covering something in his lap. After Perkins noticed a
tubular bulge in Washington's pants pocket, he asked Washington if he
could search him. Washington consented, and a subsequent search

104.
105.

Id. at 1394.
Id. at 1396.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1393.
151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1355.
Id.
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revealed several packages of cocaine in a homemade apron concealed
under his pants.110
Relying on Guapi, the court in Washington focused on the fact the
agents had not notified passengers they could refuse to consent to the
search.'
The court noted the search took place on a cramped bus and
was "consciously designed to take full advantage of a coercive environment."" 2 Accordingly, "the typical bus passenger would not feel free
to refuse the request[] ... [tiherefore we hold that the search violated
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. " "'
Judge Black dissented, observing that the court's reliance on Guapi
was misplaced." 4 In Guapi the searching officer was in uniform, but
in Washington both agents were in plain clothes. Further, the agents in
Washington made no attempt to block the aisles and conducted the
search from the back of the bus moving forward. In Washington consent
to search was asked individually, whereas in Guapi the officer made a
Judge Black concluded that given these
mass announcement." 5
differences, the court was concerned with the only factor both cases had
in common."' "[Tihe majority opinion makes notificrtion of the right
to refuse consent a requirement of a valid bus search.""'7
A synthesis of Guapi and Washington suggests that Judge Black's
conclusion has force. In the Eleventh Circuit, a bus search predicated
on consent seems to require police inform suspects they have a right to
refuse the search. Otherwise, as the dissent pointed out, "it is not clear
that there will ever be any set of circumstances under which [the] Court
[will] uphold a bus search.""' Whether Judge Black is right that the
Eleventh Circuit has created, de facto, a per se rule despite the Supreme
Court's reluctance to create such a rule, Guapi and Washington should
have a salutary effect. After those decisions, law enforcement officers
should clearly inform bus passengers of their right to refuse consent.
Those decisions should deter tactics designed to lull passengers into a

110. Id. at 1356.
111. Id. at 1355.
112. Id. at 1357.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1357-58 (Black, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1358. There were several other differences as well. There was no evidence
in Washington that the agents engaged in numerous bus searches while almost always
receiving consent. Further, there was no evidence that the agents hurried through their
consent requests or that passengers might not understand them.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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false sense of their right to refuse consent. That certainly seems a good
result.
III.

THE F=r

AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." 9
A.

The Right Against Self-Incrimination

In United States v. Grimes,2 ° the Eleventh Circuit concluded a
suspect may invoke Miranda.2 1 rights only during custodial interrogation or when interrogation is imminent. 122 In Grimes, defendant
worked as a maintenance supervisor at an apartment complex. After he
was fired, he became disgruntled at his coworkers and former boss. He
decided to express his dissatisfaction by blowing up the apartment
complex. He constructed a bomb and delivered it to the apartment
where the maintenance shop had been located when he was an
employee. Unbeknownst to Grimes, the shop had moved and a tenant
received the bomb. The bomb detonated, killing the tenant and partially
destroying the building. Grimes later bragged about the bombing to his
new employer, Kenneth Pender. Pender contacted police and began
working as an123informant, agreeing to tape incriminating conversations
with Grimes.
After Pender began working as an informant, Grimes was arrested on
bad check charges. He obtained appointed counsel and signed a form
invoking his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. The form
was filed with the police and with the state attorney's office. While
Grimes was in jail awaiting disposition of the bad check charges, he
continued to brag to fellow inmates and others about the bombing. He

119.
120.
121.
prior to
present
122.
123.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1998).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that a suspect must be warned
custodial interrogation that he has a right to remain silent and to have an attorney
during questioning).
Grimes, 142 F.3d at 1348.
Id. at 1345.
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made many of these incriminating statements to Pender. After pleading
guilty to the bad check charges, Grimes was released from jail, and
Pender agreed to pick him up. Pender took Grimes to a meeting with an
undercover officer who posed as someone who was seeking to hire an
expert in bombs and arson. Grimes once again bragged about his
bombing prowess.124
Ultimately, Grimes was arrested and charged with the bombing. He
moved to suppress his incriminating statements, arguing that the form
he executed in the bad check case, invoking his right to remain silent
and to counsel, prevented the introduction of his subsequent statements. 2 ' The district court denied his motion, and he appealed.'26
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit recognized Fifth Amendment rights
are not "offense specific."127 Thus, the Fifth Amendment could, in
theory, protect Grimes. However, the court noted that other circuits had
12
rejected the notion Miranda rights may be anticipatorily invoked. 1
Adopting the reasoning of those circuits, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
"that Mirandarights may be invoked only during custodial interrogation
or when interrogation is imminent."'29 Because no interrogation was
imminent when Grimes executed his rights form, he did not properly
invoke his Miranda rights. His incriminating statements, therefore,
Of course, Grimes's outrageous conduct
could be used against him.'
might qualify him to be the poster-boy for the Crime Control Model of
criminal procedure. If one views the result as not sufficiently friendly
to Grimes's rights, the quarrel is with the basic tenets set forth in the
Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment cases, not with the Eleventh Circuit's
application of those precedents.
In United States v. Veal,' 3 ' the court confronted the issue of whether
statements suppressed in a civil rights trial could be used in a later trial

124. Id. at 1345-46.

125. Id. at 1346. Grimes also argued that his statements to Pender while he was
incarcerated should have been suppressed because he was never given a Mirandawarning.
The court rejected this contention, holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v.
Perkinsforeclosed that argument. Id. (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990)).
In Perkins the Court concluded that there was no reason to believe that a suspect's
confession was coerced if it was freely given to another person who was secretly working
for the government. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-97.
126. Grimes, 142 F.3d at 1346.
127. Id. at 1348 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).
128. Id. (citing United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 335-40 (7th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Thompson, 35 F.3d 100, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1994); Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237,
1242-51 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953, 954-56 (9th Cir. 1992)).

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 153 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1998).
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for perjury and obstruction of justice. In Veal Officer Camacho, a
member of a Miami police drug unit, received a death threat from a local
drug dealer named Mercado. After receiving the threat, Camacho, along
with several other members of the drug squad, went to Mercado's house.
The officers escorted Mercado inside, closed the door, and lowered the
curtains. Shortly thereafter another officer arrived at the scene and
discovered that Mercado had been beaten to death. Police investigators
interviewed the officers. They gave statements denying any knowledge
of how Mercado died and denying having any physical contact with him
prior to his death. Despite this denial, physical evidence and eyewitness
testimony implicated the
officers, who were then charged with federal
13 2
civil rights violations.
At the civil rights trial, the officers moved to suppress the statements
they gave to police. 133 The district court granted the motion 3 1 pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Garrity v. New Jersey.3 1 In
Garrity the Court held that when a public employee gives a statement
during an internal investigation under a belief that failure to co-operate
with investigators will result in termination, that statement may not be
used against the employee in a later criminal proceeding.3 6 The
district court concluded the officers reasonably believed they had to cooperate, or risk termination. Therefore, their statements to police
investigators38 were suppressed.3 7 The civil rights trial resulted in no
convictions.
Several years later the officers were charged with obstruction ofjustice
and perjury because the Government contended they conspired to hide
the true circumstances of Mercado's death. The officers moved to
suppress the same statements the district court had previously
suppressed under Garrity. This time the court declined to suppress the
statements, and the officers appealed. 1 9 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "Garrity provide[s] no insulation against a subsequent
perjury or obstruction of justice charge. "14° The court explained,
"neither Garrity nor the Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecution and
punishment for false statements or other crimes while making Garrityprotected statements. Giving a false statement is an independent
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Id. at 1236-38.
Id. at 1238.
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criminal act that.., is separatefrom the events to which the statement
relates . . . ."' To be protected under Garrity, the statements must
be true."" The immunity is not, the court explained, "a license to lie
or commit perjury.""c This seems the right result. The law of immunity in the federal system, including the use-immunity statutes,'"
generally carves out an exception allowing immunized statements to be
used in a prosecution for crimes committed during the immunized
testimony, such as perjury. This is sound policy that prevents a grant
of immunity from becoming a license to lie.
Another interesting self-incrimination issue was Hill v. Turpin,'4'
another case illustrating the limits of the court's tolerance for aggressive
crime fighting tactics that may infringe on the rights of defendants. In
Hill defendant was convicted of murder in Georgia. Hill was accused of
murdering a police officer during a domestic violence incident involving
Hill, his neighbors, his daughter, and a variety of bystanders. During
the melee surrounding a police attempt to arrest a neighbor on domestic
violence charges, a police officer was shot and killed. Police discovered
Hill near the crime scene, lying on the ground suffering from multiple
gun shot wounds. 148 He was arrested and refused to speak to police
officers without the presence of his lawyer. 147 Hill was convicted of the
murder and appealed his conviction through the Georgia appellate
courts, ultimately without success. 148 He subsequently filed a habeas
corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. The district court granted him partial relief based
on sentencing irregularities, but denied him relief on his Fifth Amendment claims. 149 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court granted
Hill a new trial based on Fifth Amendment violations."' °
The Fifth Amendment violation at issue in Hill arose from remarks
made by a witness and the state prosecutor that impermissibly
commented on Hill's invocation of his right to remain silent. In Doyle v.
Ohio,'' the Supreme Court held that it is improper for a prosecutor
to comment on a defendant's invocation of the right to be free from self-
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incrimination. 15 2 The Court noted it is unfair to apprise a defendant
that he has the right to remain silent and that his silence will not be
used against him, and then to do precisely that at trial.'53 It is also
54
improper to impeach a defendant based on his post arrest silence.'
In Hill the court concluded the state prosecutor impermissibly violated
Doyle four times, despite repeated objections from defense counsel and
several admonitions from the judge.' 55 Defense counsel even filed a
motion in limine prior to trial to insure the state would not comment on
Hill's post arrest silence. The judge explicitly warned the prosecutor to
avoid any such references and entered an order to that effect. The first
violation occurred during the prosecutor's direct examination of the
state's chief investigator. When the testimony began to center around
the time of Hill's arrest, defense counsel approached the bench and
asked the judge again to remind the prosecutor not to stray into matters
concerning Hill's post-arrest silence. The court agreed and reminded the
prosecutor of the prior order. Undeterred, the prosecutor asked the
investigator to relay what Hill had said immediately after being
apprised of his Miranda rights. 15 6 The investigator replied, "His
response was nil. He did not give a response. " 15 The court, prompted
by a defense objection, instructed the jury that a criminal defendant has
no obligation to say anything and warned them about inferring anything
With the very next question, the prosecutor
from Hill's response.'
again placed Hill's post-arrest silence before the jury. He asked the
investigator if they shared any further conversation and he replied, "I
asked him if he was in great pain, and he said yes ... and I told him
that the ambulance would be there in a little bit.., and he asked me
for a cigarette, which I found him and gave it to him and at that time
he stated he wanted his lawyer."' 59 Defense counsel objected and
moved for a mistrial and a contempt hearing. The court denied the
mistrial motion and instead offered to give another curative instruction.
After court resumed from a recess, the judge once again reminded the
jury not to infer anything from Hill's invocation of his right to counsel.
The prosecutor made a third reference to Hill's silence when Hill took
the stand to testify in his own defense. After Hill testified to his account
of the shooting, the prosecutor cross-examined him by asking, "[did you

152. Id. at 619.
153. Id.
154.

See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474

155. 135 F.3d at 1418.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1414.
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159. Id. at 1415.
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ever try to explain all of this to anybody before today?""6 However,
before Hill could respond, defense counsel objected. The court sustained
the motion and once again instructed the jury. The final reference took
place during the state's closing argument. The prosecutor emphasized
Hill's failure to tell his version of the story to police at the time he was
arrested. 1 '
The court of appeals began its analysis by examining the appropriate
standard of review.6 2 The court determined that collateral review of
Doyle violations requires a reviewing court to analyze whether references
to a defendant's post-arrest silence have a "'substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'"'" The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the repeated references to Hill's post arrest
silence did substantially influence the jury's verdict. 1"
Three factors were important to the court in this case. First, the court
noted the frequency of the violations and their apparent deliberate
nature.'65 In fact, the court noted that the prosecutor had been held
in contempt for failing to better control the witness."
Second, the
court was concerned by the number of times the judge was forced to
instruct the jury to ignore the improper references.'
Indeed, one of
the curative instructions occurred after a recess, so the court reminded
the jury of the violation and then instructed them to ignore it. This
instruction, the court concluded, "may have served not to cure but to
magnify the impact of the prosecutor's improper comment.""
The
third factor was the overall weakness of the state's case. Several other
witnesses provided conflicting accounts of the murder scene, so Hill's
testimony was particularly significant. Improper attacks against his
credibility could therefore be expected to have highly damaging
results.'6 9 The result in this case seems as appropriate as the conduct
of the prosecutor and witness was inappropriate. Although there was no
finding that the prosecutor encouraged the improper testimony, the

160. Id. The court recognized that this statement standing alone would not have
constituted a Doyle violation under the Supreme Court's decision in Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 764-65 (1987). Hill, 135 F.3d at 1416 n.5. However, because the statement was
coupled with three other improper references, the court found Greer inapplicable. Id.
161. Hill, 135 F.3d at 1415.
162. Id. at 1416.
163. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)).
164. Id. at 1416-17.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1419.
169. Id. at 1418.
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prosecutor was at least guilty of failing to take steps to control the
witness, especially after the initial incident. Even that conduct falls
below the standard of behavior the system expects of prosecutors.
B.

Double Jeopardy

In United States v. Gil, 7 ' the Eleventh Circuit confronted an
interesting double jeopardy issue. In Gil Lourdes and Julian Gil were
charged with federal violations of possession with intent to distribute
17 1
cocaine and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.
Federal agents conducted a controlled delivery of five kilograms of
cocaine to Julian Gil and another man. The agents sprayed the cocaine
packages with "clue spray," a substance that is visible only under
ultraviolet light.'72 The cocaine was delivered to Gil's home. Shortly
after the delivery, Lourdes Gil drove away from the scene. The police
stopped her and discovered bundles of cash in her car. The agents
arrested Julian and Lourdes and found additional incriminating evidence
in their home. After their arrest, the Gils were inspected for the
presence of clue spray. Julian Gil had clue spray on his hands and
forearms; however, Lourdes had only small dots of the spray on her
person. Further, Julian's fingerprints were on the packages, but police
did not find Lourdes's prints on the cocaine.'
At trial Lourdes elicited testimony from a forensic chemist that several
common household substances appear fluorescent under ultraviolet light.
She also argued clue spray could be transferred by touching someone
who had the spray on his or her skin. 74 Ultimately, the jury acquitted
her on the possession count, but hung on the conspiracy count.'
The
Government sought to retry her on the conspiracy charge. Lourdes
moved to exclude the clue spay evidence, arguing that because the jury
acquitted her of possession, the the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
Government from relitigating certain aspects of the possession
charge.' 76 The district court concluded that estoppel under the Double
Jeopardy Clause requires a two-step analysis. First, a court must
examine which facts were necessarily determined by a jury's prior
verdict. Second, a court must decide if those same facts are an essential

170. 142 F.3d 1398 (11th Cir. 1998).
171. Id. at 1400.
172. Id. at 1399.
173. Id. at 1399-1400.
174. Id. at 1400.
175. Id.
176. Id. As the court of appeals noted, the term "collateral estoppel" is often used in
this context, although a better term might be "direct estoppel" because the estoppel is being
applied in the same case. Id. at 1400 n.3.
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element of the pending case."' The district court concluded the jury
must have decided the clue spray evidence did not prove Lourdes had
touched the cocaine packages. Therefore, the court precluded the
Government from introducing the clue spray evidence at the retrial. 78
The Eleventh Circuit agreed the district court's two-step inquiry was
correct.
The court, however, disagreed with the district court's
conclusions and reversed the case.' 79 The court of appeals determined
the jury did not necessarily reject the clue spray evidence merely
because it acquitted Lourdes on a possession with intent to distribute
count.8 ° The jury may have credited "Lourdes's assertions that she
never intended to distribute the drugs.""8 ' The proper inquiry, the
court explained, is whether the jury must have determined the efficacy
of the clue spray evidence.' 82 Otherwise, it is inappropriate to "'speculate' regarding the meaning of the jury's verdict.""
The burden was
on defendant to show estoppel applies, and she could not "demonstrate
that the issue whose relitigation [s]he seeks to foreclose was actually
decided in the first proceeding.""
Turning to the second part of the test, the court determined that the
issue of whether Lourdes touched the cocaine was not an essential
element of the conspiracy charge. 88 As long as the issue decided in
the first case does not go to an essential element of the retried case,
double jeopardy does not apply. The Government could establish a
conspiracy regardless of whether Lourdes ever touched the cocaine.'86
Therefore, the court concluded, under the second prong of the analysis
the clue spray evidence was not barred."' The court's conclusion is
fully consistent with the approach to estoppel reflected in prior Eleventh
Circuit cases"s and Supreme Court cases. 8 '
Another double jeopardy issue arose in United States v. Fern. 90
Fern was charged with mail fraud, witness tampering, and violations of

177. Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1996)).
178. Id.
179. Id. 1401-02.
180. Id. at 1402.
181. Id. at 1401.
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting United States v. Bennett, 836 F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 1988)).
184. Id. (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990)).
185. Id. at 1401-02.
186. Id. at 1401.
187. Id. at 1401-02.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461 (11th Cir. 1996).
189. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.
342 (1990).
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the Clean Air Act, all of which derived from a complicated insurance
scam. Fern owned an asbestos testing firm. He was hired to test for
asbestos contamination in a local resort that had been damaged by a
fire. The resort maintained insurance that covered the cost of asbestos
removal only if the asbestos contamination resulted from fire. Fern
fabricated test results to show the resort was extensively contaminated
with asbestos. He contracted with the resort's project manager, who was
aware of the scam, to remove the asbestos despite not having the
appropriate federal license certifying Fern's company in asbestos
removal. Undaunted, Fern fabricated the appropriate forms indicating
he had hired a certified asbestos removal firm to assist him with the
project. Fern completed the project and the resort's insurance carrier
paid for the asbestos removal.'91
Fern was eventually arrested, and at trial the Government called an
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") agent to testify against him.
The agent testified, and two days later the prosecutor learned the agent
was under investigation for theft of government property. The following
day the prosecutor promptly disclosed this information to Fern's
attorney. Fern attempted to recall the agent to the stand, but the agent
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Fern moved for a
mistrial, and the district court granted the motion. 92 Although the
court's opinion is not explicit on this score, it probably is safe to assume
that the district court found that the cross-examination on the misconduct allegations was appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)
and that the inability to cross-examine on the issue created a manifest
necessity for a mistrial.
The Government sought to retry Fern, and he argued retrial violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause. He contended that another prosecutor,
working in the public corruption section of the United States Attorney's
office, had been aware of the accusation against the ATF agent and
should have disclosed the incriminating information. The district court
conducted extensive evidentiary hearings on the motion. The court
concluded that at the time the prosecutor learned of the accusation, no
ATF internal investigation had occurred, and the accusations were
unsubstantiated. Further, the prosecutor had been unaware that the
ATF agent was testifying in any pending cases.' 93 The court denied
Fern's motion and he appealed."9

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 1300-02.
Id. at 1302-03.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
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The Eleventh Circuit began by explaining that ordinarily when a
defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not bar retrial. 9 ' However, the court stated, double jeopardy may
be implicated if the government "goads" the defendant into seeking a
mistrial. 1" Determining whether a defendant has been goaded into
seeking a mistrial depends on the objective facts and circumstances of
the case. 9 ' In Fern the court concluded the objective facts did not
support the contention the Government intentionally induced Fern to
move for a mistrial or had behaved in a grossly negligent fashion.'98
The court determined the prosecutor who was trying the case against
Fern promptly disclosed the information about the ATF agent immediately after he received it."
Further, the prosecutor who originally
received the information reasonably believed it to be preliminary and
had no obligation to reveal it to anyone at that time."3 Accordingly,
the court concluded, there was no "goading" on the Government's part
and Fern's retrial was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.2 '
Given the fact-finding about the purposes of the prosecutors, the court
of appeals reached the right result. Expanding double jeopardy
protection following a mistrial to cases involving unintentional or merely
negligent conduct by the prosecution would provide a windfall to the
defendant who is granted a mistrial. Ironically, it might also create a
powerful incentive for trial courts not to find manifest necessity for
mistrials, thereby robbing defendants of even the advantage of a fresh
start in an untainted proceeding.
In United States v. Mendez,20 2 another case concerning double
jeopardy, Mendez was charged with assaulting a mail carrier with intent
to steal mail and with possessing stolen mail. Mendez and two other
men robbed several postal employees at gunpoint and stole their mail
trucks. The men sifted through the stolen mail looking for credit cards
they could use to make purchases. 2 '
They were eventually apprehended, and Mendez was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114,
a statute criminalizing the knowing and willful taking of mail from a

195. Id. at 1304.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679-80 (1982) (Powell, J., concur-

ring)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1304-05.
200. Id.

201. Id.
202.
203.

117 F.3d 480 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 481-82.
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mail carrier by force.2" 4 Mendez was also charged with a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1708, a criminal statute that prohibits the unlawful
possession of stolen mail when a person knows it to be stolen and
possesses the specific intent to possess it anyway. °5 A jury convicted
him on both counts. Mendez moved to vacate his conviction, contending
that section 1708 was a lesser included offense of section 2114 and that
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited sentencing him on both
charges. 2" The district court denied his motion, so he appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit.20 7
The issue was whether the counts charging the violations of section
1708 and section 2114 are "separate offenses" under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Under the well-known Blockburger20 8 test, crimes
established by different statutes are separate offenses if each contains
an element the other does not. 2° If one crime contains an element the
other does not, but the other contains no unique element, then the
the ccrime
defendant may not be punished for both crimes. 210 If th
without a unique element carries a lower potential punishment, then
that crime is the lesser included offense of the crime with the greater
punishment. Consistent with this, the court explained the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits sentencing a criminal defendant for two
separate offenses unless the offenses contain at least one different
element.2 u The court concluded that under the facts of this case, the
robbery and the possession were contemporaneous.2 12 The unlawful
possession count was subsumed by the claim that Mendez assaulted a
mail carrier with the intent of taking the mail. Therefore, the possession count was a lesser included offense of the assault count, and double
jeopardy prevented separate sentences for each offense. 213 The court
vacated Mendez's sentence for possession of stolen mail and remanded
the case for sentencing on the assault claim.2 14
Two observations may be made. First, had the district court
recognized section 1708 as a lesser included offense of section 2114,

204.
205.

Id. at 486 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2114 (1988)).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1708 (1988)).

206. Id. at 484.
207. Id.
208. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
209. 117 F.3d at 486.
210. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
211. Mendez, 117 F.3d at 486 (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1992)).
This test is often called the "same elements" test or the "Blockburger" test after the
Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger. Id.
212. 117 F.3d at 487.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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defendant could have requested instructions allowing convictions on the
lesser included offense (each count has a five year maximum penalty)
instead of the more serious section 2114 charges, which carry twenty-five
years on each count. Second, although the court remanded the case for
resentencing because of defendant's successful argument, it appears to
be a pyrrhic victory. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the total
sentence of imprisonment was 162 months. 21' Although the district
court imposed forty-two months on one of the section 1708 counts to run
consecutively, it is unlikely that the total sentence of imprisonment will
be much different at resentencing because the guidelines focus on offense
conduct rather than the number of counts of conviction." 6
Although the specific guideline calculation was not part of the
published opinion, it appears that the district court will be able to
impose the guideline sentence of 162 months on either of the section
2114 counts. If the defense had successfully requested lesser included
offense instructions, and if the jury had chosen to convict on the lesser
section 1708 offenses, defendant's sentence would have been capped at
ten years, which represents the total statutorily allowed sentence on the
two section 1708 counts.
C. Due Process
The courts have construed the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to guarantee numerous procedural safeguards during a
criminal trial. The Eleventh Circuit confronted several of these issues
during the survey period.
1. Improper Jury Argument. In recent years the Eleventh Circuit
has addressed many cases concerning improper remarks made by
prosecutors during jury trials. That trend continued during the current
survey period. In United States v. McLean," ' the Government charged
McLean with possession of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine,
contending he was involved in a crack cocaine distribution network
operating in Fort Lauderdale, Florida." 8 At trial the prosecutor stated
during closing argument, "there is something unique and distinctive
about crack cocaine. And we speak here today ...

on behalf of the

people who have no voice. Those are the crack addicted babies
languishing in hospitals around the country."2 19 McLean objected to

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 484.
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES, Ch.1, Pt. A, subpts. 4(a), (e).

138 F.3d 1398 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1400-02.
Id. at 1405.
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this remark. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit concluded the statement
"[was] a blatant appeal to the fears and prejudices of jurors and [was]
obviously improper."220 However, the court determined "the government is saved from constitutional error by the overwhelming evidence
against McLean." 22' The court reminded trial courts to safeguard the
rights of defendants by punishing lawyers who violate the "high
standards we should all demand."22 2 The court offered no suggestions,
however, regarding what punishment might be appropriate.
A similar situation arose in United States v. Wilson.22 Wilson was
charged with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.2" His
arrest stemmed from a negotiation with an undercover agent for the sale
of 4.5 ounces of cocaine. However, when the sale commenced, Wilson
delivered only one-half ounce of cocaine. Wilson had been targeted by
a multi-agency task force concentrating on major cocaine dealers.2 5
He was arrested and charged. At trial the prosecutor elicited testimony
that the investigation involving Wilson concentrated on "large scale
dealers of drugs."226 Despite numerous defense objections, the prosecutor continued to refer to Wilson as a "major drug dealer"227 even
though the charges stemmed from a relatively minor amount of cocaine.
Wilson also contended prosecutorial misconduct arose when the
prosecutor elicited testimony that Wilson held a gun to a federal agent's
head during a prior drug transaction that resulted in a criminal
conviction. 22'
Although the prior conviction was admissible as
404(b) 2 29 evidence, the prosecutor twice emphasized the violent nature
of the transaction.m0
Wilson was convicted, and on appeal the Government conceded it was
inappropriate to elicit the details of the conviction but argued that the
evidence against Wilson was overwhelming. 231 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed and noted that prosecutorial misconduct requires a two-part
analysis. First, the remarks must be improper. Second, the defendant's
substantial rights must be prejudiced. 232 The court concluded that
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id.
149 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1998).
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
Wilson, 149 F.3d at 1300-01.
Id. at 1300 n.3.
Id.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 1301 n.4.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Wilson, 149 F.3d at 1301 n.4.
Id. at 1302 n.6.
Id. at 1301.
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although "some of the pertinent remarks ... were improper... [the]
Defendant has shown no prejudice." 3 The court was persuaded by
the facts that the evidence against Wilson was overwhelming and that
the district court attempted to cure the violations with instructions to
the jury. Because the jury is presumed to have followed those instructions, Wilson was not granted a new trial.'
The court then remarked, "[w]e thus find ourselves in a situation with
which we are all too familiar: a prosecutor has engaged in misconduct
at trial, but no reversible error has been shown."235 The court reminded trial courts to supervise the conduct of prosecutors and punish them
for excessive transgressions. However, unlike the court in McLean,23
the court offered a list of possible sanctions appropriate to address
prosecutorial misconduct. The court suggested: "1) contempt citations;
2) fines; 3) reprimands; 4) suspension from the court's bar; 5) removal or
disqualification from office; and 6) recommendations to bar associations
to take disciplinary action."237 However, the court of appeals also
noted that reversal is rarely the appropriate remedy to deter prosecutorial misconduct because it provides a "windfall" to defendants.238
Another case concerning improper remarks made by a prosecutor was
Cargill v. Turpin.2 ' 9 David Cargill was convicted in Georgia of murder
and armed robbery and was sentenced to death.2 ' He appealed his
conviction through the Georgia appellate courts without success.24 1 He
sought federal habeas corpus review in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia, and the district court denied him
relief.24 2 He appealed that decision to the Eleventh Circuit.243

The crux of Cargill's appeal concerned a series of statements the
prosecutor made during the state trial. He contended that during the
guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor made three improper comments
during his opening statement. 2" First, Cargill asserted that the
prosecutor erred when he indicated one of the state's witnesses became
acquainted with Cargill when the witness began searching for someone

233. Id. at 1301-02.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1303.
See supra note 164.
Wilson, 149 F.3d at 1304.
Id. at 1303 (quoting United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1992)).
120 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1372.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1376.
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to kill his wife.245 Second, the prosecutor improperly remarked that a
Third,
co-defendant told police that Cargill was the murderer.2"
Cargill contended the prosecutor improperly informed the jury that
several witnesses had not told police what they knew about the murders
because they were afraid of defendant.247
The Eleventh Circuit easily concluded that all three statements were
improper.2 8 However, the court explained the proper standard of
review was whether the statements rendered Cargill's trial fundamentally unfair.249 The court concluded that given the overwhelming evidence against him, Cargill had not been overly prejudiced by the
prosecutor's remarks.2 50 The court also noted Cargill's counsel had not
contemporaneously objected to the remarks, thereby depriving the trial
court of the opportunity to remedy the violation with a curative
instruction.2 51
Further, both the prosecutor and defense counsel
repeatedly informed the jury that opening statements are not evidence.
Therefore, the jury was probably not overly influenced by remarks given
during the opening statement.2 52
A more difficult and closer question concerned another statement the
prosecut6r made during the closing argument portion of the sentencing
phase of Cargill's trial. As the jury grappled with the decision whether
to sentence Cargill to life imprisonment or death, the prosecutor
remarked:
Is the appropriate price life imprisonment, and 10 years or 15 years or
ever how long it is, seven years or five years, when a bunch of little
boys are sitting around the Christmas table thinking, "Is that all the
jury thought of my mama and daddy because253that man is sitting off
somewhere eating Christmas turkey dinner?"
Cargill contended this statement was improper because the clear import
of the statement was that without a death sentence, the defendant could
be released in as little as five years. 2" However, the majority in
Cargill rejected that approach. 255 The court concluded that because

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Cargill had been charged with both murder and armed robbery, the
statement was an accurate representation of Georgia law.256 The court

focused on the conjunctive nature of the comment. The prosecutor stated
that the sentence could be life imprisonment and "10 years or 15 years
or ever how long it is, seven years or five years." 2 7 Because under
Georgia law a sentence for five years to fifteen years was permissible for
armed robbery, the court construed the remark as proper.2 8 Additionally, the court determined that taken in its entirety, the prosecutor's
remarks were an appropriate attempt to convey the seriousness of the
crime. 2 " At most, the court concluded, the remark was ambiguous,
and a reviewing court is required to view such remarks in the least
damaging light reasonably permissible under the circumstances.2 °
Finally, the court also pointed out the prosecutor had commented that
life in a Georgia prison is not "any piece of cake."26 1 Therefore, the
jury was not overly prejudiced into concluding the262only adequate
sentence would be the imposition of the death penalty.

Judge Kravitch agreed with the majority's conclusions concerning the
statements made during the guilt phase of the trial. She dissented,
however, from the court's holding that the remarks during the sentencing phase did not render Cargill's sentence fundamentally unfair.2"
Specifically, Judge Kravitch concluded that the majority's highly
technical parsing of the prosecutor's statement, although plausible, was
not the likely interpretation the jury would have made. 2' Because the
jury would have been unfamiliar with the permissible sentence for
armed robbery, the likely import of the statement was that without the
imposition of the death penalty, Cargill could be released in as little as
five years. Further, Judge Kravitch noted that the prosecutor remarked
a "bunch of little boys" would wonder why the defendant had been
released so quickly.265 If Cargill served time for the murders, plus the
five to fifteen years imposed for the armed robbery, "the victims' children
would hardly be the 'bunch of little boys' the prosecutor described." 2"
Finally, Judge Kravitch also noticed that the prosecutor indicated that

256.

Id.

257. Id.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b)).
at 1381-82.
at 1382 n.25 (citing Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).
at 1382.

262. Id.
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Id. at 1387 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 1388.
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the life sentence would be a "judicial slap on the wrist," indicating
Cargill would be released in a short period of time.2"7 These remarks,
the judge concluded, likely caused the jury to impose the death penalty
because of a mistaken belief that Cargill would be released after serving
five years for a life sentence. 2"
For that reason, she concluded,
Cargill's sentence should have been reversed.269
These closing argument cases illustrate a tension between the values
of the Crime Control Model and those of the Due Process Model. The
Crime Control Model disapproves of giving the defendant the windfall
of a new trial for errors that do not affect the outcome. However, the
question arises: How can prosecutorial over-reaching be deterred if
errors are deemed harmless? The court obviously struggles with this
issue. Besides formal sanctions of offending attorneys, perhaps the court
could try to deter misconduct by identifying and chastising the attorneys
in published opinions. The court has been reluctant to do so, as these
opinions illustrate. While it is a serious step to take because of the
consequences for the prosecutor, it is a step that may serve to deter and
to punish.2 7 ° Effective sanctions are needed to balance the values of
the Crime Control and Due Process Models.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence. In United States v. Hardin,27 ' the
Eleventh Circuit addressed a due process issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence needed to convict a criminal defendant. Hardin was
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Hardin conceded
he was a convicted felon and entered into a stipulation with the
Government to that effect.272 The stipulation was never filed with the
court, however, and more importantly it was never introduced into
evidence during Hardin's trial. During the trial both the Government
and Hardin's attorney referred to Hardin's status as a convicted felon;
however, the Government never attempted to introduce the stipulation
into evidence. Hardin never objected during the trial to the references
to his felon status, nor did he move for a directed verdict at the close of
the Government's case.273

267. Id.
268. Id. at 1389.
269. Id. at 1390.
270. Emily Heller, Court of Appeals Issues Rebuke for Prosecutor'sDrug Trial Closing,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY RPTR., Jan. 28, 1998, at A4.
271. 139 F.3d 813 (11th Cir. 1998).
272. Id. at 815; see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (requiring the
government to accept defendant's stipulation that he was a convicted felon during a
prosecution for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm).
273. Id. at 814.
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On appeal Hardin argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him
because the Government never proved an essential element of the case:
that he was a convicted felon.274 The court of appeals noted that the
circuits were split on the issue of whether a stipulation removes the
Government's obligation to prove the stipulated element.275 The court
decided, however, that Hardin's stipulation he was a felon "eliminated
the government's burden to produce evidence of his felon status."276
The court seemed persuaded that Hardin's own assertions at trial that
he was a convicted felon, as well as his failure to object to the prosecution's references to his felon status, constituted a waiver of the traditional requirement that the Government prove all the essential elements of
the charge.27 7 Despite finding a waiver, the court pointed out that
failing to offer the stipulation was not wise trial practice. Indeed, the
jury may well have acquitted Hardin based on that omission. The court
suggested that obviously the better practice is to introduce stipulations
into evidence.2 7

However, in this case "Hardin ... ha[d] no legal or

279
equitable basis to contest the government's mistake."
Another due process case concerning the sufficiency of evidence was
United States v. Toler.2 s° In Toler numerous defendants were charged
with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. One of the defendants was
Traci Mathis. Mathis was charged with being a part of the cocaine
distribution conspiracy based on her association with a drug dealer
named Rod Savage. The evidence at Mathis's trial showed that Mathis
allowed Savage to stay in her apartment for several weeks. She became
angry at Savage because he did not pay his portion of the utility bills
and because he allowed another drug dealer to enter the apartment.
Eventually, Mathis changed the locks and locked Savage out. Savage
informed Mathis he left some cocaine in the apartment, and she
demanded that he pay her five hundred dollars for its return. Mathis

274. Id. at 815.
275. Id. at 816-17 (citing United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 678-79 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding conviction is invalid unless jury is presented with the stipulation); United States
v. Branch, 46 F.3d 440, 441 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding stipulation removes government's
obligation to prove stipulated element); United States v. James, 987 F.2d 648, 650 (9th Cir.

1993) (holding failure to offer stipulation into evidence leaves jury with no proof of the
stipulated element)).
276. Id. at 817.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 144 F.3d 1423 (11th Cir. 1998).
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testified that she demanded the money because Savage had earlier
promised to buy her a VCR.28'
Based on the evidence that Mathis knew Savage was storing cocaine
in her apartment, the Government charged her with being part of the
cocaine distribution conspiracy.2 2 She was convicted of conspiracy at
trial.28 The Eleventh Circuit reversed her conviction, holding "[we]
cannot conclude that the government's inferential leap suffices to cross
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mathis agreed to join
the chasm of proof
24
the conspiracy."

8

The court noted the appropriate standard of review for any criminal
case' is whether there is substantial evidence supporting a conviction. 288 Further, due process demands proof of every element beyond
a reasonable doubt. 28 The court explained that prior Eleventh Circuit
decisions suggested that only slight evidence was needed to connect a
particular person to a conspiracy once the underlying conspiracy was
proved.28 7 That formulation, the court concluded, was contrary to the
due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 "The
"slight evidence" rule as used and applied on appeal in conspiracy cases
... should not have been allowed to worm its way into the jurisprudence
of [this circuit].'" 2 9 Applying the appropriate standard, the court
concluded there was not substantial evidence to suggest that Mathis
knew about and agreed to join the conspiracy.29 Mathis might well
have been charged with criminal blackmail or possession of cocaine, the
court conceded, but her actions " "could hardly be termed to be an act in
furtherance of [the] conspiracy. 291
Judge Henderson concurred in the result, emphasizing that in order
to sustain a conspiracy conviction, the Government must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt a conspiracy existed, the defendant knew the
essential objectives of the conspiracy, and the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily participated.29 2 The evidence suggested Mathis knew about

281. Id. at 1430-32.
282. Id. at 1433.
283. Id. at 1425.
284. Id. at 1433.
285. Id. at 1426.
286. Id. at 1427 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979)).
287. Id. (citing United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 1994)).
288. Id.
289. Id. (quoting United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc)).
290. Id. at 1433.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1433-34 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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the conspiracy, but by changing the locks and locking Savage out she
clearly was not acting in furtherance of its objectives. Indeed, as the
judge explained, her actions "seem[ed] to constitute only interference
with the business of the conspiracy."293 Judge Henderson concluded,
"this is a very close case," 29' but ultimately the Government could not
meet its burden.295
In dissent Judge Black argued there was sufficient evidence to connect
Mathis to the conspiracy. 2'
However, he was sympathetic to the
majority's conclusion because Mathis's sentence, imposed pursuant to the
sentencing guidelines, was "unduly harsh." 29 7 Judge Black lamented
that the district court did not have the discretion to reduce her
sentence.298 Interestingly, Mathis's sentence never appeared in the
court's opinion despite the fact that it may well have been the driving
force behind the court's conclusion.
Mathis's case raises several interesting points. First, the court of
appeals was quite right to put to rest the "slight evidence" test, which
is an unfortunate misformulation that has confused the traditional test
for sufficiency of the evidence and has appeared to lower the standard
in favor of the Government. Second, this case is an example of a
familiar scenario: The court is wrestling with what to do with the least
culpable defendant in a multi-defendant drug case in which the penalties
are quite high for all defendants because of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Judge Black's dissent on the sufficiency of the evidence has a lot of force.
The evidence seems sufficient to conclude that a reasonable jury could
have found Mathis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Perhaps Judge
Black is also correct that the real solution might be in significantly
reducing the penalties for the least culpable defendant under the
guidelines.
In Taylor v. Singletary,2 the Eleventh Circuit decided whether
defendant's due process rights were violated when he was impeached
during his state drug conspiracy trial with testimony he had given in a
previous federal trial under an informal immunity agreement. Taylor
made a living supplying aircraft to drug smugglers. He entered into an
informal immunity agreement with the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of Florida in which he agreed to testify against certain
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drug dealers in exchange for a promise that he would not be prosecuted.
The immunity agreement only applied to the Southern District of Florida
and by its terms did not preclude state or federal prosecution in another
district.3"
Taylor testified before a federal grand jury and in a
subsequent criminal trial that arose from the grand jury's investigation.
At no point during either proceeding did Taylor invoke his right against
self-incrimination. 30 1
Florida prosecutors subsequently indicted Taylor for conspiracy to
traffic drugs. He sought to have the indictment dismissed, arguing the
federal immunity agreement precluded state prosecution. 2 The
Florida trial court denied his motion, and Taylor's case proceeded to
trial. 3 During his trial Taylor elected to testify in his own defense.
The Florida prosecutor sought to impeach Taylor's credibility using
testimony from the federal trial in which he had testified under the
immunity agreement. Taylor objected, arguing that his prior immunized
testimony could not be used against him in any way, including
impeachment. The trial court allowed the impeachment testimony, and
Taylor was convicted." ° ' After exhausting his state remedies, Taylor
sought habeas corpus review in the federal courts.0 5 The district
3 6 court
denied him relief, and Taylor appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 0
Taylor's primary argument on appeal was that his original testimony
was per se involuntary because he was forced to testify under an
immunity agreement. Therefore, his testimony could not be used against
him in the ensuing state trial, even for impeachment purposes.0 7 The
court rejected Taylor's per se argument, holding "[a] voluntarily-entered
informal immunity agreement does not, by virtue of its existence,
override a witness' free will such that the witness' testimony is
involuntary under the Due Process Clause."3 8 The court compared

300.

Id. at 1277-78.

Taylor contended an Assistant United States Attorney orally

promised him the immunized testimony could not be used against him during a state trial,
but the promise was not contained in the immunity agreement. Id. at 1279.
301. Id. at 1279.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1280.
306. Id.
307.

Id.

Taylor also argued the immunity agreement precluded state prosecution;

however the court determined that the agreement by its express terms did not apply to
state authorities. Id. at 1284-85. There was also no evidence that the agreement had been
orally modified to bar state prosecution as Taylor contended. Id. at 1285.
308. Id. at 1280. Because Taylor was challenging the actions of Florida authorities, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was implicated, not the comparable
provisions of the Fifth Amendment. However, in this instance the distinction is irrelevant.

1999]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

959

Taylor's argument to a similar argument previously rejected by the
Supreme Court in Bordenkircher . Hayes. 9
In Bordenkircher petitioner claimed his plea of guilty violated due
process because state authorities threatened to indict him under a repeat
offender statute if he did not plead guilty to the indictment. The Court
rejected the contention that the prosecutor's conduct constituted a per se
violation of due process. ° The Court explained the prosecutor did "no
more than openly present[] the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial [by pleading guilty] or facing charges on which he
was clearly subject to prosecution."3 1'
Similarly, Taylor was faced with the choice of testifying under an
informal grant of immunity or being prosecuted. The court construed
this arrangement as "give and take" bargaining that did not deprive
Taylor of his option to exercise his free will.312 He was merely forgoing
his right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in exchange
for an immunity grant. After rejecting Taylor's per se argument, the
court determined whether, under the facts of his case, Taylor's testimony
was involuntary.3" 3 The court noted that Taylor testified during the
trial that he voluntarily consented to the agreement to avoid prosecution
and "get it all behind me."314 Accordingly, the court3 5refused to conclude that Taylor's decision to testify was involuntary.
The court's approach seems entirely appropriate. The analogy to the
plea bargaining situation is apt. Declaring Taylor's testimony involuntary under these facts would be a victory for due process values but
would constitute a serious obstacle that would disrupt the bargaining
process that is necessary to the efficient operation of the criminal justice
system. In this context the court's favoring of the Crime Control Model
strikes the proper balance.
The final significant due process case the court confronted during the
survey period was also entitled Taylor v. Singletary.1 6 Taylor and
Ortiz were charged with murder by Florida authorities. The cases were
severed, and Taylor sought to have his case tried after Ortiz was tried.
Taylor provided the trial judge with an affidavit from Ortiz indicating
Ortiz would provide exculpatory information during Taylor's trial. Ortiz
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maintained, however, he would assert the privilege against selfincrimination unless he was tried before Taylor and was convicted or
acquitted before Taylor's trial began. Taylor offered to proffer Ortiz's
testimony in camera, but the trial court refused the offer. The court
denied Taylor's motion, and Taylor was tried before Ortiz. True to his
word, Ortiz invoked the Fifth Amendment when Taylor called him as a
defense witness. Taylor's counsel informed the court that had Ortiz not
invoked the privilege, he would have testified that Taylor was not
present at the murder scene. Taylor was ultimately convicted.31
At his trial Ortiz testified he had been at the murder scene with
another man named Mark, not with Taylor. Ortiz implicated Mark by
testifying the victim was still alive when Ortiz left the murder scene, but
Mark remained behind with the victim. Ortiz was eventually acquitted.318 The fact that Ortiz testified made this an unusual case.
Usually, the co-defendant who is to offer the exculpatory testimony
decides he does not want to testify in his trial and, therefore, refuses to
testify at a joint trial or a trial preceding his own. Here, Ortiz refused
to testify at the earlier trial but then testified at his trial. Taylor
appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court's decision to try Taylor
first deprived him of his rights to due process and to present a defense. 19 His state appeals were unsuccessful, and Taylor sought
habeas corpus review in federal district court. The district court
concluded that Taylor's constitutional right to present an exculpatory
witness had been violated but that the error was harmless. The court
denied0 him habeas relief, and Taylor appealed to the Eleventh Cir32
cuit.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision that the
error was harmless.3 2 ' The court noted the state trial court gave no
reason why Taylor's trial had to go first. Further, the court refused to
hear Taylor's in camera proffer and did not consider the "substance,
nature, or effect of Ortiz's testimony."322 The proper standard of
review, the court explained, was not whether the state trial court's
decision was harmless, but whether Taylor was deprived of his right to
present a witness that was material and favorable to his defense."s
Taylor needed only to show that Ortiz's testimony could reasonably "'put
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in
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the verdict.'"324 The court concluded Taylor's "inability to call Ortiz
essentially precluded him from putting on a defense."325 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed Taylor's conviction and remanded the case for
a new trial.32
This decision is a sound one. Promoting a fairer process for Taylor
(and vindicating the values of the Due Process Model) could have been
achieved at a low cost. All that was necessary was to alter the order of
the trials.
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.327
A.

The Right of Confrontation

The court examined a relatively straightforward Confrontation Clause
issue in United States v. Mills.3" Jack and Margie Mills were majority shareholders and owners of a Medicare services provider, First
American, Inc. They were indicted, along with First American and
several other corporate officers, for Medicare fraud and other related
federal offenses. 3"
During trial the district court judge became
impatient when lawyers for First American and Jack Mills employed
what the judge described as "tag team" cross-examinations.3 3 ° Ultimately, he forbade Mills from cross-examining a government witness
named Terris who detailed many of the financial techniques used to
perpetrate the fraud. The court required Mills to forgo cross-examination and to use First American's lawyers to examine Terris."'1
The court of appeals easily concluded that this conduct deprived Mills
of his Sixth Amendment confrontation right.332 The court explained

324. Id. at 1395 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1995)).
325. Id. at 1396.
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the Confrontation Clause is designed to ensure the adequacy of evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting that evidence to the rigorous
testing of the adversarial process.333 Although a court has discretion
to limit cross-examination, a defendant must be allowed some opportunity to conduct a meaningful cross. Because Mills "did not get to crossexamine the witness at all ... the [district court] was not operating
within any discretion to control the progress of the trial. " S4
The court then turned to the appropriate standard of review to
determine whether the error required reversal. Mills argued that denial
of confrontation rights was a structural defect that mandated reversal.335 The Government contended that the error should be analyzed
under the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard utilized to
examine many trial errors.33 The court of appeals sided with the
Government, concluding that errors predicated on confrontation rights
fall squarely within the trial error category.33 ' Employing harmless
error analysis, the court concluded that because Terris was not a vital
witness, because she had been effectively cross-examined by First
American, and bevcause the rest of the Government's case was strong,
Mills had not suffered reversible error.3 Although the conviction was
not reversed, this case sends a message that forbidding cross-examination completely is reversible error. The case leaves uncertain how much
the scope of cross-examination can be limited.
B.

Assistance of Counsel
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are common, but getting a
reversal on that basis is unusual. This makes any decision reversing a
conviction because of ineffective assistance a noteworthy case, and there
were several such decisions during the survey period. The criminal
justice system's handling of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, on
the whole, is a clear example of the dominance of the values of the
Crime Control Model of criminal procedure. To relitigate a case, the
errors by counsel must have a profound prejudicial effect. It is
interesting that the balance between Crime Control Model values and
Due Process Model values is somewhat different in cases involving
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in death penalty cases. Because
of the high stakes in death penalty cases, the courts are a bit more

333.
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searching in scrutinizing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in such
cases. Not surprisingly, two of the three cases featured here were death
penalty cases.
The test for determining whether counsel's performance has been
ineffective is (1) whether the performance falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) whether a reasonable probability
exists that without counsel's unprofessional conduct, the outcome would
have been different. 3 9 Applying that standard the Eleventh Circuit
decided three interesting ineffective assistance of counsel cases during
the survey period.
In Dobbs v. Trpin, 4 a case with a lengthy procedural past in the
Eleventh Circuit, the court concluded trial counsel's representation
during the sentencing phase of a death penalty case was ineffective.3 4'
Dobbs was charged with murder and armed robbery of a convenience
store. He was convicted by a jury in Georgia and sentenced to death.
His numerous state and federal direct and habeas corpus appeals were
unsuccessful. 342 One of his numerous enumerations of error focused
on the deficient performance of his lawyer during the sentencing phase
of his trial. When he originally sought habeas corpus review, he did not
have a transcript of the sentencing phase of his trial. The federal
district court decided this claim based on the testimony of his trial
counsel concerning his actions during the state trial. Based on this
testimony, the district court denied Dobbs habeas corpus relief. 34
Almost ten years later, Dobbs's attorneys discovered stenographic
notes of the sentencing phase of his trial in a court storage building.
Dobbs sought to reopen and amend his appeal, but the district court
denied his request.344 After the Supreme Court heard the case and
ordered this newly discovered evidence to be considered," Dobbs
successfully maintained he had been provided ineffective assistance of
counsel during the sentencing phase of his state court trial. The district
court granted his habeas corpus petition and ordered a new sentencing
hearing based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The State appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit. 34
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The trial transcript revealed that during the closing argument of the
sentencing phase of the trial, Dobbs's attorney never introduced any
mitigating evidence that might have convinced the jury not to impose
the death sentence.3 47
Further, Dobbs's lawyer apparently never
investigated his background to determine if there was any mitigating
evidence to present.3"
There was some evidence that Dobbs had
undergone an unfortunate childhood which might have persuaded a jury
not to impose the death penalty.14
Apparently, Dobbs's attorney
based the decision not to present any evidence on the mistaken notion
that mitigating evidence would have been inadmissible during the
sentencing phase of the trial. He also believed that introducing
mitigating evidence might "open the door" to more damaging impeachment evidence." 0
The Eleventh Circuit noted that in ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, "'a heavy measure of deference [is given] to
counsel's judgements,'" but those decisions must flow from an accurate
understanding of the law. 5' Because the assumption that mitigating
evidence was inadmissible during the sentencing phase of the trial was
legally erroneous, the court concluded it was not objectively reasonable.352 Therefore, under the first prong of the Strickland test, Dobbs's
attorney's performance was inadequate.
The court also noticed that Dobbs's closing argument consisted in large
part of reading to the jury Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v.
Georgia.353 The court of appeals was troubled by this strategy for two
reasons. First, it was not particularly effective advocacy. Second, and
more importantly, the crux of the argument was that the Supreme Court
was likely to strike down Georgia's death penalty statute. The court
concluded a jury might have imposed the death penalty on Dobbs under
the assumption it might never be implemented."M This argument, the
court concluded, also failed to pass muster under the first prong of
355
Strickland.
Turning to the second prong in Strickland, the court examined
whether the deficient performance of Dobbs's lawyer prejudiced his
sentence. The test, the court explained, is whether there is a reasonable
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probability that without counsel's deficient performance, the outcome
would have been different.3 5 The court of appeals concluded that
because Dobbs's crime was not as egregious as many death penalty
cases, a jury may well have decided not to impose the death penalty if
it had been made aware of mitigating evidence.357 The second prong
of Stickland thus satisfied, the court remanded the case for a new
sentencing.35
In Collier v. Turpin,359 another ineffective assistance of counsel case,
the Eleventh Circuit determined the attorneys in a death penalty case
were ineffective for failing to consult an expert witness who might have
established that defendant's diabetes contributed to his violent acts.3 °
Collier was charged with murdering a police officer who was trying to
apprehend him. He was convicted after a four-day trial and sentenced
to death. The sentencing hearing took two hours and began on a Friday
evening after the trial ended.3"' Collier filed numerous state and
federal appeals seeking to have his conviction and sentence reversed, all
without success.362 He eventually appealed to the Eleventh Circuit,
arguing
his counsel was ineffective during the sentencing phase of his
363

trial.

Specifically, Collier presented evidence he was a gentle man without
a violent past.3

4

He suffered, however, from diabetes and he argued

his attorneys should have determined whether his diabetes could have
influenced his violent acts on the evening he committed the murder. He
contended such evidence should have been presented during the
sentencing phase of his trial to reduce the possibility the jury might
impose the death penalty.365 The court of appeals agreed. The court

noted Collier's lawyers were aware of his diabetes, knew he was not
taking the correct dosage of insulin, and knew that this act was out of
character for a "gentle, respectful and hardworking [man]." 3 ' Therefore, the court concluded, Collier's attorney's were ineffective for "failing
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to pursue an expert on diabetes to examine Collier and testify at the
sentencing phase."367
Further, the court concluded Collier's attorneys should have presented
additional mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. Collier's trial
lasted four days and the sentencing hearing two hours. The majority of
the evidence presented by Collier's counsel centered on his reputation as
truthful in the community.sr For instance, Collier's wife testified
during the sentencing phase and was asked by his attorney if Collier
was a hard worker. When she replied that he was, Collier's attorney
responded, "I believe that's all I need to ask her."369 Nine other
witnesses were asked similarly succinct questions. Not surprisingly, the
court concluded Collier's attorneys were ineffective for failing to present
much of the "readily available evidence of Collier's background and
character that would have led the jury to eschew the death penalty."7 °
These shortcomings, the Eleventh Circuit decided, failed to meet the
objective reasonableness prong articulated in Strickland and rendered
Collier's lawyers ineffective. His lawyer's actions also created a
"reasonable probability that, but for their errors, [Collier] would not
have received the death penalty."'71 Based on that determination, the
court reversed Collier's sentence and remanded the case for imposition
of a new sentence. 72
Holsomback v. White173 was an interesting Eleventh Circuit case
because the court reversed a noncapital case based on ineffective
assistance of counsel grounds.374 Holsomback was charged with
repeatedly sodomizing his ten-year-old son over five years. His son was
the only witness who testified against Holsomback, and there was no
medical evidence to support the allegations. This was so despite the fact
the child had been examined by a doctor twelve days after reporting the
incident to his mother. 75
At trial Holsomback's attorney never presented any evidence or
elicited any testimony regarding the lack of medical corroboration. He
only mentioned the lack of medical evidence once during the trial when,

367. Id.
368. Collier's attorneys contended they were limited by the trial court to presenting
only this type of "character" evidence, but the court of appeals, after reviewing the record,
rejected that contention. Id. at 1287-88.
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during closing argument, he remarked that "the reason the doctor wasn't
here was because there was no evidence [the child] had ever been
touched or molested or abused."376 Holsomback's counsel also never
spoke with the family doctor who had examined the child or obtained
any medical opinion regarding the significance of the dearth of medical
evidence. 77
The court of appeals concluded this lack of investigation constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.3 7 The court determined that under
the Strickland test, a reasonable lawyer would have sought medical
opinions and presented the jury with some evidence that the lack of
medical evidence was significant. The omission was particularly
troubling, according to the court, because the only evidence against
Holsomback was the testimony of his son. Further, there were several
inconsistencies in that testimony that rendered it subject to attack.
Therefore, the court held the omission undermined "our confidence in the
trial outcome" and it reversed Holsomback's conviction.3 79
Judge Cox, in dissent, concluded the omission of medical evidence and
He also did
medical investigation was premised on trial strategy.
decision
not to
his
attorney's
not believe Holsomback was prejudiced by
Judge Cox's
explore the lack of medical evidence with the jury."
record
did not
dissent is rather persuasive, particularly because the
contain evidence of the likely result of the investigation. Further, the
defense attorney explained his lack of investigation by saying that the
prosecution conceded a lack of medical evidence and that calling the
doctor created a 'risk that the prosecution would gain some small
concession during cross-examination.382 The majority simply did not
buy this explanation, but Judge Cox found it sufficient. Although Judge
Cox did not raise the point, the decision in Holsomback, if followed
strictly as precedent, opens the door for other claims based on the failure
of counsel to investigate, even where a strategic reason for the decision
is proffered.
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